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Security Controls

Auth enforcement

  • All /api/* endpoints are protected; public endpoints are listed in the API reference
  • Admin-only routes use admin middleware; user routes require user auth
  • Supported credentials: dashboard session cookie, Authorization: Bearer <api token>, Auth0 JWT (when enabled), and HTTP basic auth

Sessions

  • Dashboard and SSO logins issue an opaque, random session token. Only a SHA-256 of the token is stored (in the sessions table, or in memory when no database is configured)
  • The cookie is HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, and Secure on HTTPS; it expires after session_ttl_minutes and is revoked on logout
  • State-changing requests authenticated by cookie are rejected when the Origin or Sec-Fetch-Site headers indicate a cross-site request

Password storage

  • Database passwords are stored as bcrypt hashes. Rows created before hashing are upgraded transparently on the user's next successful login
  • Accounts provisioned through SSO have no local password and cannot log in with one
  • Passwords are never returned by any API response

Outbound requests

  • Proxy listener targets and redirects are restricted to public addresses; loopback, private, link-local (including cloud metadata) and other non-routable ranges are refused
  • Tunnel clients cannot ask the server to dial arbitrary hosts; all remotes are reverse

Secrets at rest

  • AI provider API keys are encrypted with AES-256-GCM. Set CHISSL_ENCRYPTION_KEY (32 bytes, or any longer passphrase) in the server environment; without it a built-in default key is used and a warning is logged at startup
  • SSO client secrets are write-only through the API (has_client_secret reports presence)

Login backoff

  • Exponential backoff and temporary lockouts after repeated failures
  • Optional per-IP buckets

IP rate limiting

  • Max requests per minute per IP with temporary ban on abuse

Security events & webhooks

  • In-memory event ring with optional DB persistence
  • Dispatch to JSON or Slack-formatted webhooks